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Abstract 
Background: The majority of reward learning neuroimaging studies have not focussed on 
the motivational aspects of behaviour, such as the inherent value placed on choice itself. 
The experience and affective value of personal control may have particular relevance for 
psychiatric disorders including depression.  
Methods/Design: In this study, we adapted an fMRI reward task that probed the value 
placed on exerting control over one’s decisions, termed ‘choice value’, in 122 healthy 
participants. We examined activation associated with choice value; personally-chosen 
versus passively-received rewards; and reinforcement learning metrics such as prediction 
error. Relationships were tested between measures of motivational orientation (categorised 
as Autonomy, Control and Impersonal), and subclinical depressive symptomatology. 
Results: Anticipating personal choice activated left insula, cingulate, right inferior frontal 
cortex and ventral striatum (P<0.05 FWE-corrected). Ventral striatal activations to choice 
were diminished in those with subclinical depressive symptomatology. Personally-chosen 
rewards were associated with greater activation of the insula/IFG, cingulate cortex, 
hippocampus, thalamus and substantia nigra compared to rewards that were passively 
received. In people who felt little control over their own behaviour (Impersonal orientation), 
prediction error signals in nucleus accumbens were stronger during passive trials.  
Discussion: Previous finding regarding personal choice have been verified, and taken 
forward through the use of both reinforcement learning models, and correlations with 
psychopathology. Personal choice has an impact on the extended reward network, 
potentially allowing these clinically-important areas to be addressed in ways more relevant 
to personality styles, self-esteem and symptoms such as motivational anhedonia.  
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Introduction  
Disruption in motivation and reward processing are key elements of many psychiatric 
disorders, including anhedonia in major depressive disorder (MDD), negative symptoms in 
schizophrenia, and mania in bipolar disorder (1).  
Standard reward tasks (e.g. ‘monetary incentive delay’), allow examination of reward 
prediction, anticipation, and consumption (for review see (2; 3)). However, it has become 
apparent that reward processing is affected by whether an individual values being able to 
make their own choices: the inherent value of exercising personal control (4; 5).  Being able 
to exert control over one’s own environment is beneficial to psychological well-being (6), 
making investigations of such concepts relevant for patient groups and the wider 
population. Indeed, Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (7) argues that our core needs are for 
Autonomy (experience of enacting personal volition), competence (sense of mastery over 
one’s environment) and relatedness (social belonging). These determine inclination to 
pursue behaviour for its own intrinsic enjoyment (8), which is at the heart of motivational 
anhedonia.  
Derived from SDT is the concept of the ‘locus of causality’, describing the source 
from which a person perceives their behaviours to be motivated (9): (1) Autonomy-oriented 
individuals are intrinsically self-motivated, seeking out opportunities for information 
gathering, personal challenge and self-determination; (2) Control-oriented individuals take 
cues from environmental factors, e.g reward, deadlines and public opinion; (3) Impersonal-
oriented individuals feel they have little intentional control over their behaviour, deferring 
to concepts such as luck or fate. Notably, the Impersonal orientation has previously been 
associated with depressive symptoms within healthy individuals (9).  
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Factor analysis suggests the causality orientations have partial overlap with 
personality concepts described by the NEO Five Factor Inventory: ‘Control’ shares variance 
with agreeableness, and ‘Impersonal’ with neuroticism; whereas ‘Autonomy’ stands as a 
separate entity (10). Moreover, whereas traits such as neuroticism are relatively stable over 
the life-course, and have a significant genetic underpinning (11), one’s locus of causality is 
considered more dynamic (12), and is likely more environmentally-adaptive.  
 Neurobiologically, the feeling of personal control (13), even when  illusory (14), is 
associated with striatal activation, which suggests it may itself incur an additional value 
signal not typically captured by reward-learning paradigms. Leotti & Delgado attempted to 
isolate this within a reward learning context by testing whether the mere anticipation of 
control, elicited by a cue signalling an opportunity to make a choice versus a passive 
selection, would recruit neural systems of reward. They found that cues indicating personal 
control elicited greater reward system activation in both reward-obtaining (15) and loss-
avoiding (16) contexts. However, this previous paradigm did not clearly dissociate between 
choice anticipation and receipt of the reward itself.  Here, we have adapted this ‘value of 
choice’ task to clearly separate anticipation and outcome phases of choice, and applied 
reinforcement learning models to better characterize the relationship between the value of 
choice and neural activation in healthy individuals.  
Specifically, our aims were to: (a) verify previous findings concerning choice-
anticipatory activation; (b) determine whether responses to rewards differ according to 
whether or not they were personally won or passively received; (c) establish that, with 
appropriate modification of the original paradigm, computational models of reinforcement 
learning can explain observed brain activity; (d) determine whether elicited activation co-
varies with subclinical depressive symptoms, and personality factors relevant to depression, 
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namely neuroticism and measures of causality orientation. We anticipated that high 
neuroticism and Impersonal scores would be associated with diminished activation to the 
inherent value of choice because depression has been linked to other types of blunted 
reward value (17). We were particular interested in the roles that the striatum and 
dopaminergic midbrain might play, given their key importance in reinforcement learning, 
incentive salience and hedonic signalling.  
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Methods  
Participants 
Individuals were selected from a wider ongoing study (‘STRADL’, STratifying Resilience and 
Depression Longitudinally, (18)), and underwent lifetime diagnostic screening using the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM disorders (19) and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) criteria. Only those without a lifetime diagnosis of major 
mental illness were included in the current analyses, which were performed when data from 
the first 149 healthy control participants were available. Exclusions comprised: fifteen 
people due to non-performance of the task (no response or incorrect for > 33% of trials); six 
due to scan acquisition technical difficulties; and six for excessive motion (>3 events 
involving motion > [0.5 x largest voxel dimension = 2.5mm]), leaving n=122 participants. All 
participants provided written informed consent, and the study was approved by local and 
regional ethics committees.  
 
Neuropsychology and behavioural analyses 
Neuropsychological data collected included the General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS) 
(20), which examines the sources from which a person is motivated to act (9), consisting of 
3 dimensions: Autonomy, Control and Impersonal. Neuroticism scores, the severity of 
depressive symptoms, and handedness were also assessed (see Supplementary Materials). 
 
Neuroimaging data acquisition and preprocessing 
Data were acquired using a 3T MRI scanner, TR=1.56s (see Supplementary Materials).  
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The modified inherent value of choice imaging task 
The task was adapted from (15) and implemented in NeuroBehavioural System’s 
Presentation software. Each trial had three phases (Figure 1): (1) the ‘cue’ phase, where 
participants learned whether they would personally be making the reward decision (Choice 
value trial), or would be following the computer’s direction (No-choice value trial); (2) the 
‘selection’ phase, whereby a decision was made between a yellow or blue card; and (3) the 
‘outcome’ phase, when participants received a probabilistic reward according to their 
decision. During the selection phase, participants were able to freely select their preferred 
card during Choice trials; on No-choice trials, a rectangle appeared around the card which 
the computer had selected for them, which they were obliged to confirm. Selections were 
made via a button press.  
 
In the original task, the yellow and blue cards shared equal reward contingencies. In our 
adaptation, they had different contingencies in order to permit modelling of reinforcement 
learning: the yellow card was associated with an 80% chance of a 100-point reward, and the 
blue card with a 20% chance. The alternative outcome was 0 points. We also introduced 
1500-4000ms of jitter between selection and outcome phases of each trial, allowing for 
disambiguation of all three phases.  
 
Participants completed 66 trials, 33 Choice, and 33 No-choice. Trial order and the side of the 
screen on which the yellow and blue cards appeared were randomised, preventing final 
action planning. Decisions made by the participant during Choice trials were mirrored by the 
computer with a 3-trial lag during No-choice trials, in an effort to match the overall rewards 
received across conditions of interest. Total task length was 14 min 59 sec.  
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Participants were told their objective was to learn which colour card was more likely to give 
them points, by trial and error. They were informed that for some trials they would get to 
choose, but in others the computer would chose for them. During the latter they had to 
follow the computer’s selection. They were also told that the reward contingencies 
remained consistent regardless of whether they or the computer were doing the choosing. 
A post-scan questionnaire asked participants to rate their desire to win points on a scale of 
1 to 10, and their preference for Choice or No-choice trials. 
 
FMRI data analysis 
Two analytic approaches were adopted:  
1. The basic model was used to (i) verify that appropriate reward responses were seen 
for the outcome phase contrast of reward 100 > 0, regardless of Choice/No-choice; 
(ii) verify the results previously reported by (15) regarding cue phase Choice > No-
choice activation; (iii) assess Choice > No-choice activation during the reward phase, 
and the Choice x reward interaction; and (iv) examine the associations between 
contrasts from (ii) and (iii) with the three GCOS causality orientations (Autonomy, 
Control, Impersonal), neuroticism and depressive symptomatology. 
2. The Pavlovian reward learning model attempted use a computational framework to 
estimate how much each participant “valued” being able to choose, by fitting a 
temporal difference learning model to the data. This considered the cue phase 
Choice and No-choice indicators as though they were stimuli to be “conditioned” on 
subsequently obtained rewards. We proposed that the degree to which the model’s 
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value estimate accounted for Choice anticipatory activation would be dependent on 
causality orientation, neuroticism and depressive symptomatology. 
 
Basic model 
This was modelled at the first level as a series of delta functions convolved with a canonical 
haemodynamic response function, the onsets of which were denoted by experimental 
conditions of interest. These were the onsets of the Choice and No-choice cues; and the 
onsets of trial outcome, with Choice/No-choice and 0/100 points being modelled separately, 
giving six experimental vectors of interest. Nuisance regressors included the onsets of 
yellow/blue selection; trials where an incorrect response or no response was received; and 
motion parameters.  
At the second level, cue phase contrasts of Choice > baseline and No-choice > 
baseline were entered into a random-effects flexible factorial analysis, modelling the factors 
of participant and Choice/No-choice. The outcome phase was considered in a separate 2 x 2 
flexible factorial analysis incorporating the contrasts of Choice 100 > baseline, Choice 0 > 
baseline, No-choice 100 > baseline and No-choice 0 > baseline, modelling the factors of 
participant, Choice/No-choice and reward amount (see Supplemental Methods). For both 
models, each participant’s desire to win points, and any difference in points received for 
Choice versus No-choice trials, were included as nuisance covariates. Regions identified as 
showing significant activation for the contrasts of interest were subject to extraction of the 
first eigenvariate for the suprathreshold cluster, and their relationships with our covariates 
of interest explored (Autonomy, Control, Impersonal, QIDS depressive symptoms and EPQ-R 
neuroticism scores). This was done using backwards regression within SPSS (version 23, 
https://www.ibm.com/analytics/us/en/technology/spss/): for each extracted region, the 
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model that best accounted for the data was identified by ANOVA; within this, significant 
coefficients of explanatory covariates being reported. These were subjected to FDR 
correction with q=0.05 across all comparisons, and standardised β values reported.  
 
Pavlovian reward learning model 
The task was also modelled as an instance of classical conditioning, using a temporal 
difference learning model (21). We wished to identify whether learning rate varied 
according to whether or not participants were actively choosing. The model implemented 
four different learning rates: 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8, used to generate cue value and prediction 
error (PE) estimates across the task for each participant, based on their cue-outcome 
experiences during the scan. The unconditioned stimulus (US) was the outcome phase of 
each trial (the receipt of 100 or 0 points). The conditioned stimuli (CS) were the Choice and 
No-choice indicators during the cue phase (see Supplementary Materials). Cue value was 
used to modulate trial-by-trial regressors representing the cue phase of each trial, and PE 
was modulated the outcome phase. Choice and No-choice conditions were modelled 
separately. These were entered into first-level SPM analyses, with a different SPM for each 
learning rate. Contrast estimates for each regressor were taken into second-level 2 x 4 
flexible factorial analyses, which modelled the main effects of participant, Choice/No-choice 
and learning rate. As we expected choice value estimates to strongly covary with measures 
of Autonomy, Control, Impersonal, neuroticism and depression scores, these were included 
in the second-level analyses, modelling interactions with both Choice/No-choice and 
learning rate.  
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For both the Basic and Pavlovian models, second-level contrasts were evaluated at a whole-
brain voxel height threshold of p<0.05 FWE-corrected. Given a priori interest in the striatum 
and dopaminergic midbrain, we also conducted region-of-interest analyses within a 
structurally-defined mask comprising bilateral caudate, putamen, and dopaminergic 
midbrain (see Supplementary Materials). Masked voxels were reported as significantly 
activated if they exceed a FWE-corrected height threshold of p<0.05.  
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Results 
Demographics, neuropsychology and symptoms 
Median age was 62 years; and 46% were male (Table 1). There was no correlation between 
age and task performance (p > 0.823). 93% of participants preferred making their own 
choices. Learning continued throughout the task, with the most rewarding card being 
chosen 79% of the time during the final quarter of the session (Supplemental Figure 3). Both 
QIDS depression (τ=0.213, p=0.003) and Impersonal scores (τ=0.197, p=0.003) were 
positively correlated with neuroticism.  
 
Basic model: (i) Reward verification 
See supplementary materials. 
 
Basic model: (ii) Verifying anticipation of choice: cue phase  
Cue phase Choice > No-choice revealed strong activation in the cerebellum, left insula, left 
cingulate/SMA, and right IFG, corrected for the whole brain volume ( 
Figure 2, Table 2). Bilateral putamen was activated within the striatum/midbrain a priori 
mask (Figure 3a). No-choice > Choice showed activation in occipital cortex only (Table 2).  
 
Basic model: (iii) Reward and choice: outcome phase 
Next we examined whether responses to personally-earned outcomes differed from those 
passively received. The outcome phase Choice > No-choice contrast showed significant 
activation in the bilateral insula, anterior cingulate, right IFG, left hippocampus and left 
thalamus ( 
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Figure 2, Table 3). Within the striatum/midbrain ROI, there was significant Choice > No-
choice activation within the left substantia nigra and right caudate nucleus. No-choice > 
Choice activated left middle frontal cortex, precuneus and angular gyrus.  
 
Reward x choice interaction activations 
The contrast of Choice (0 > 100) > No-choice (0 > 100) showed activation in right IFG pars 
opercularis (Table 3). Conjunction analysis confirmed that this lay within the Choice > No-
choice cluster (P=0.038 FWE-corrected), but not that of 0 > 100 (Error! Reference source 
not found.a). Contrast estimates suggested enhanced activation when one personally failed 
to win (Error! Reference source not found.b).  
 
Relations to traits of interest 
QIDS depressive symptoms were negatively related to left putamen anticipation: Choice > 
No-choice (β=-0.365, p<0.001, Figure 3b). During the outcome phase, Autonomy had a 
positive association with right IFG/insula Choice > No-choice activation (β=0.280, p=0.045), 
whereas Impersonal demonstrated the inverse relationship (β=-0.255, p=0.025).  Within 
precuneus, Control had a positive relationship during outcome: No-choice > Choice 
activation (β=0.396, p<0.001), but conversely Impersonal showed a negative association in 
the same region (β=-0.288, p=0.012, Supplemental Figure 4). Here QIDS depression 
demonstrated a similar pattern to Control (β=0.226, p=0.039). Table 4 details these 
relationships.  
 
Pavlovian reward learning: The value of personal choice 
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The final analytical thread considered whether the ability to choose was intrinsically 
rewarding in itself, within a reinforcement learning context. During the cue phase of each 
trial, there were no main effects of Choice/No-choice or learning rate. However as 
anticipated there was significant covariation with several metrics of interest (Table 5). 
Increasing Autonomy was associated with greater No-choice > Choice value estimates in 
right amygdala (p=0.008), and greater Choice > No-choice value estimates in anterior 
caudate (p=0.019). Again during the cue phase, Control orientation demonstrated a positive 
relationship with learning rate in the right superior temporal sulcus (p=0.017).  
 
During the outcome phase, there was a significant main effect of learning rate (α) in ventral 
striatum, with a lower α being associated with greater PE representation (p<0.001). 
Conversely, there was an effect of increasing α in the right anterior insula and SMA 
(p<0.006). Learning in ventral striatum therefore appears to operate over a longer timescale 
than in insula/SMA. Finally, Impersonal showed a stronger PE representation for No-choice 
> Choice in bilateral nucleus accumbens (p<0.004, Figure 3c and d). For interest, results 
significant at p < 0.001 uncorrected can be found in the supplemental materials. 
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Discussion  
 
In this study, we modified Leotti and Delgado’s 2011 inherent reward of choice task, to (a) 
verify their previous findings; (b) disambiguate the cue and outcome phases; (c) 
demonstrate the utility of computational models in this context; and (d) see whether task-
elicited activation covaried with personality factors of relevance to depression. Their 
findings concerning choice anticipation were replicated within our larger independent 
sample of healthy controls. The task was amenable to Pavlovian reward learning analysis. 
We then demonstrated a series of novel findings within regions key to reward and 
depression, their relation to depressive symptoms, and measures that attempt to 
“personalise” notions of reward and value. This aligns them with the depressive phenomena 
of motivational anhedonia, and devaluation of the self.  
 
Anticipating choice 
We verified the striatal anticipatory response to choice as seen in Leotti and Delgado, 2011. 
Critically we observed that this effect was diminished in those with more depressive 
symptoms, suggesting an impairment in the hedonic value or salience attributed to personal 
choice. Reduced ventral striatal reward-linked responses are a well replicated finding in 
those with MDD, be it when viewing positive images (22) - which correlates with anhedonia 
(23) - or anticipating and receiving rewarding outcomes (24; 25). In healthy controls, 
depressive symptoms correlate with a reduction in the usual performance-enhancing effects 
of positive feedback, implying striatal dysfunction (26). Striatal activation correlates with 
enhanced recall of personally-chosen items, and exerts a modulatory effect over 
hippocampus (27): this mechanism may underpin the cognitive biases observed in MDD. It 
is notable that we too report striatal dysfunction in a group of healthy controls, who have 
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not been subject to the effects of medication or an episodic illness, while having a narrower 
distribution of depressive symptoms. We also find enhanced insula and cingulate activation 
during Choice > No-choice anticipation: these regions have been shown to correlate with 
momentary subjective well-being in rewarding contexts (28), supporting the view that 
personal choice is intrinsically appetitive. Both are key components of the salience network, 
and play a role in cognitive control (29). 
 
Personally-earned versus passively-received rewards 
Responses to personally-chosen outcomes were enhanced compared to those that were 
passively received: insula/IFG and cingulate cortex were apparent, as were hippocampus, 
thalamus and substantia nigra. Right IFG pars opercularis (IFGpo) demonstrated a choice x 
reward interaction, whereby there was an enhanced response when participants personally 
failed to win. Right IFGpo plays a specific role (30) in the inhibition of motor and affective 
responses (31). It is also activated by personal “regret” versus simple disappointment (32). 
It could be argued that personally failing to win induces a self-blame response (33) that 
requires inhibition or emotional regulation. Such a response would be relevant to 
depression and particularly to resilience in the face of adversity (34).  
 
Inferior frontal gyrus and goal-sensitive self-regulation 
Right IFG/insula showed a Choice > No-choice response across the sample during the 
outcome phase, which was enhanced by high Autonomy, but diminished by high Impersonal 
scores. The concept of locus of causality is not far removed from that of learned 
helplessness, which inspires animal model of MDD, and gives ventral prefrontal cortex (IFG) 
particular prominence in a recent update by its architects Maier and Seligman (35). 
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Prolonged aversive events are proposed to stimulate the raphe nuclei, releasing serotonin 
within the striatum (inhibiting behaviour) and amygdala (inducing fear and anxiety), 
irrespective of detected contingencies. This response is inhibited if the agent has previous 
experience of acting to escape aversive events, mediated by ventral prefrontal cortex’s 
regulatory influence over the raphe nuclei and striatum. They suggest this process equates 
to the agent being able to imagine having control over future aversive situations. Right 
IFG/insula are crucial contributors to cognitive control, governing the ability to select and 
maintain goal-directed action at the expense of other alternatives (36). Strong meta-
analytic evidence support their role in the cognitive reappraisal of emotional stimuli (37). 
Reduced responses to negative affective stimuli have been reliably demonstrated in those 
with MDD (38). Here we show the IFG’s response to personal choice is greater in those 
having high Autonomy, and reduced in those having an Impersonal, passive style. The latter 
may therefore have a reduced ability to act to escape aversive situations, and regulate 
subcortical limbic responses to aversive events, whereas the former would be more 
adaptive and resilient. Bhanji and colleagues linked resilience to believing one has personal 
control (39): they found that one’s ability to overcome setbacks was reduced following 
exposure to an acute stressor; however this was diminished in those who believed that they 
had some control over the setbacks.  
 
The precuneus and agency perception 
The precuneus showed a No-choice > Choice response during the outcome phase, especially 
so in those with high Control, with the opposite being seen with high Impersonal scores. 
Precuneus is part of the default mode network, and generally deactivates during goal-
directed tasks (40). This happens to a lesser degree during tasks having a self-referential 
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component, taking a first person perspective, or inducing the experience of agency (41). It 
also activates when mentally simulating the actions of another versus oneself (42), taking 
perspectives alternative to one’s own (43), and considering the emotional states of both 
yourself and others versus neutral judgements (44). More abstractly, it is activated during 
judgements of intentional versus simple physical causality (45). In summary, it is arguable 
that any process that involves consideration of an intentional agent engages precuneus, 
regardless of whether this is one’s own self, although the self is likely to prevail during 
default mode operations. The Control orientation may increase the propensity to seek cues 
in the minds of others, and consider the computer’s “intentions”. Conversely, the 
Impersonal orientation show an apparent abolition of the effect seen in the general sample, 
suggesting a reduced inclination to consider intentionality at all.  
 
Reinforcement learning 
The final analysis phase attempted to capture the learning process underlying how the 
Choice/No-choice cues developed their inherently rewarding character, and how this 
related to participants’ characteristics. The use of a computational model potentially allows 
for a more mechanistic understanding of the activation observed, and highlighted 
relationships with personality metrics that weren’t detected during the basic analysis. Highly 
Autonomous people encoded value during presentation of the No-choice cue within right 
amygdala, suggesting that either No-Choice cues (46), or the uncertainty associated with 
what the computer might select (47), were regarded as aversive. They also showed greater 
Choice > No-choice cue valuations in dorsal anterior caudate, which through its interactions 
with prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in goal-directed action (48). High Control 
participants showed enhanced learning in the right superior temporal sulcus, which is 
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especially involved in considering the intentions of external others (49). Finally, high 
Impersonal participants had stronger nucleus accumbens PE signals for passively-received 
rewards, suggesting that a reduced belief in the ability to control one’s behaviour related to 
more reward system reactivity to “gifted” versus “earned” rewards.  
 
Limitations 
A number of study participants were unable to perform the task correctly, suggesting that it 
was subjectively hard to understand, or that a potentially important section of the 
population have been excluded. We have not examined trial-by-trial assessments of choice 
preference, or changes in stay/switch behaviour, which are also believed to covary with 
depressive symptoms (26). The 80:20 yellow:blue reward contingency was used to permit 
reliable learning across a range of participants, and may have induced ceiling effects in some 
participants, as we did not find a simple interaction between Choice/No-choice and learning 
rate. However it allowed us to focus on whether or not the participant did the choosing, 
without that choice in itself being particularly onerous. Indeed, if a choice versus no-choice 
decision involved a difference in deliberation that could have introduced additional 
confounds. Alternatively, our temporal difference learning model may not have adequately 
captured the variance introduced by personal choice. 
 
Clinical relevance 
Our findings suggest that the modified inherent value of choice task could be able to 
provide useful insights into the neurobiology of MDD. Within this large sample of healthy 
controls, we have shown how personal choice modulates activation within areas known to 
be disrupted in MDD. This covaries with how inclined a participant is to see themselves as 
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the driver of their actions; to look to the outside world for their cues; or even to feel at a 
loss as to why they act at all. Being able to tease apart how particular manifestations of 
personality impact on one’s vulnerability to MDD is likely to be important to stratification. 
Characteristics such as causality orientation arguably build on more stable and heritable 
measures such as neuroticism, as they are more responsive to environmental events, and so 
may provide more timely information regarding the risk of transition to illness, as well as 
offering targets for psychotherapeutic interventions. The hope is that by examining the 
reward system in a manner that ties self-perception to behaviour, more clinically-applicable 
insights can be drawn. For example, a particularly effective therapeutic strategy for those 
having a high Impersonal/low Autonomy style might be to both enhance dopaminergic 
transmission, and challenges self-orientation beliefs during CBT. 
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Tables 
 Kendall’s  τ 
Correlation (p) 
Measure (possible range) Median (IQR) Skewness  
 
Kurtosis  
 
Neuroticism 
Age 62.0 (3.00) -0.574 0.630  
Sex (F:M) 56:66    
Handedness (R:L:A) 111:5:6    
GCOS: Autonomy (12-84) 68 (10) -0.881 1.071  
GCOS: Control (12-84) 48 (10) -0.007 0.637  
GCOS: Impersonal (12-84) 37 (16) -0.176 -0.714 0.197 (0.003) 
Neuroticism (0-12) 2 (3) 1.217 1.843  
QIDS (0-27) 3 (2) 1.262 2.382 0.213 (0.003) 
Desire to win (1-10) 7.5 (4.0) -0.742 -0.047  
Trial preference  
(Choice:No-Choice) 
114:9    
Points won (0-6600) 3500 (1200) -0.384 0.017  
No-Choice / Choice points 0.623 (0.39) -0.044 -1.167  
No-choice trials missed (0-33) 1.00 (3.00) 1.840 2.675  
Table 1: Demographic, personality, symptom and behaviour measures. Only significant 
correlations between personality and symptom measures are shown. No-choice trials where 
the participant chose the card not pre-selected by the computer were defined as “missed”. 
IQR is interquartile range. Standard error of skewness was 0.220, and of kurtosis was 0.437. 
 
 
Contrast Region MNI coords Voxels T Z P (FWE-
corrected) 
Choice > 
No-choice 
L cerebellum -38 -56 -52 55 5.57 5.24 0.001 
L insula -40 16 2 63 5.29 5.01 0.004 
R IFG 50 12 6 24 5.06 4.81 0.010 
L cingulate/ SMA -10 28 32 20 5.04 4.80 0.010 
R insula 40 18 6 5 4.68 4.48 0.038 
L putamen -20 10 -2 84 4.33 4.17 0.008* 
R putamen 22 12 -4 55 4.19 4.04 0.012* 
No-choice 
> Choice 
R occipital cortex 12 -88 -2 118 6.56 6.05 <0.001 
L occipital cortex -18 -82 -14 148 6.11 5.69 <0.001 
Table 2: Choice/No-choice anticipatory activation during the cue phase. FWE-corrected p 
values are for the whole brain volume, except where “*” denotes FWE-corrected 
significance within the striatum/midbrain mask. IFG: inferior frontal gyrus. SMA: 
supplementary motor area. 
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Contrast Region MNI coords Voxels T Z P (FWE-
corrected) 
Choice > 
No-choice 
R insula/IFG 36 20 -8 1789 8.93 Inf <0.001 
R cingulate/medial 
superior frontal 
0 38 28 3125 7.78 7.47 <0.001 
L insula -36 20 -10 303 6.05 5.90 <0.001 
L ventral anterior 
thalamus 
-12 -2 -6 34 4.69 4.62 0.024 
L hippocampus -26 -6 -16 4 4.60 4.53 0.034 
L substantia nigra -8 -14 -14 122 4.45 4.38 0.003* 
R caudate 12 4 8 4 3.85 3.81 0.030* 
No-choice 
> Choice 
L MFG -30 30 52 75 5.40 5.29 0.001 
L precuneus -2 -64 32 36 4.81 4.73 0.015 
L angular gyrus -48 -62 24 27 4.80 4.72 0.015 
Choice (0 
> 100) > 
No-choice 
(0 > 100) 
R IFG 34 20 10 5 4.56 4.50 0.038 
Table 3: Outcome phase activation: Choice versus No-choice. FWE-corrected p values are for 
the whole brain volume, except where “*”denotes FWE-corrected significance within the 
striatum/midbrain mask. IFG: inferior frontal gyrus. MFG: middle frontal gyrus. MTG: middle 
temporal gyrus. 
 
Phase Region Contrast Metric Standardised 
β 
T 
(DoF) 
P (corrected) 
Cue L putamen Choice > 
No-choice 
QIDS -0.365 3.734 
(113) 
<0.001 
Outcome R IFG/insula Choice > 
No-choice 
Autonomy 0.280 2.253 
(113) 
0.045 
Impersonal -0.255 2.758 
(113) 
0.025 
L precuneus No-choice 
> Choice 
Control 0.396 4.888 
(114) 
<0.001 
Impersonal -0.288 2.986 
(115) 
0.012 
QIDS 0.226 2.467 
(113) 
0.039 
Table 4: Relationships between significant activation clusters and metrics of interest (GCOS 
causality orientation, neuroticism and QIDS depressive symptoms). DoF: degrees of 
freedom.  
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Phase Contrast 
 
Region MNI Voxels T Z P (FWE-
corrected) 
Cue (CS) x 
model 
value 
Autonomy  
x 
(No-choice > 
Choice) 
R basolateral 
amygdala 
26 0 -24 14 4.72 4.69 0.008 
 
Autonomy 
x  
(Choice >  
No-choice) 
L dorsal anterior 
caudate 
-18 18 8 20 4.49 4.46 0.019 
Autonomy  
x 
Decreasing α 
L anterior 
caudate 
-18 26 4 32 4.72 4.70 0.003 
Control 
x 
Increasing α 
R superior 
temporal sulcus 
48 -24 -6 31 4.52 4.49 0.017 
Outcome 
(US) x  
model 
prediction 
error 
Main effect: 
Decreasing α 
B ventral 
striatum 
-12 10 -12 51 5.81 5.76 <0.001 
Main effect: 
Increasing α 
R insula -34 20 8 37 5.09 5.05 0.005 
Main effect: 
Increasing α 
L supplementary 
motor area 
-4 22 44 132 5.29 5.24 0.002 
Impersonal 
x 
(No-Choice > 
Choice) 
B nucleus 
accumbens 
-12 16 -10 23 4.44 4.41 0.004* 
Table 5: Pavlovian conditioning of Choice versus No-choice. CS: conditioned stimulus. US: 
Unconditioned stimulus. X denotes an interaction between a GCOS subscale, and the 
contrast described. FWE-corrected p values are for the whole brain volume, except where 
“*”denotes FWE-corrected significance within the striatum/midbrain mask. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: The modified inherent value of choice task 
 
Figure 2: Choice > No-choice activation during the cue (red) and outcome (green) phases. (a) 
L cingulate cortex, (b) L hippocampus and thalamus, (c) Anterior insula and inferior frontal 
cortex, and (d) L subtantia nigra. Images shown achieve a whole-brain voxel height 
significance threshold of p < 0.05 FWE-corrected. 
 
Figure 3: (a) Choice > No-choice anticipation (Cue phase) contrast demonstrating activation 
in bilateral putamen. (b) The relationship between QIDS depression score and L putamen 
activation (β=-0.365, p<0.001). (c) Left nucleus accumbens shows a correlation between 
Impersonal orientation and No-choice > Choice effect for Outcome phase prediction error 
encoding. (d) The relationship between Impersonal orientation and L nucleus accumbens 
Outcome phase prediction error activation.  For (a) and (c), results achieve a voxel-height 
significance of p < 0.05 FWE-corrected within the striatum/midbrain mask. 
 
Figure 4: The choice x reward interaction within R IFG during the outcome phase. (a) 
Activation maps for Choice > No-choice (red), reward 0 > 100 (green) and the choice x 
reward interaction (blue), displayed at a whole brain voxelwise FWE-corrected threshold of 
p < 0.05. (b) Contrast estimates extracted from the interaction cluster. 
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The Neurobiology of Personal Control During Reward Learning  
and Its Relation to Mood 
 
Supplemental Information 
 
 
Neuropsychology and behavioural analyses 
The General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS), is derived from Self-Determination Theory 
(1), examines the sources from which a person is motivated to act (2), consisting of 3 
dimensions: Autonomy, Control and Impersonal. Participants rate 12 vignettes of situations 
probing these dimensions, with total subscale scores ranging between 12 and 84. Neuroticism 
scores were derived from the Eysenck’s Personality Questionnaire – Revised (EPQ-R; short 
form (3)). The severity of depressive symptoms were derived by self-report using the Quick 
Inventory of Depressive Symptomology (QIDS; (4)). Handedness was determined using the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (5).  
 
Neuroimaging data acquisition and preprocessing 
Data was acquired using a Philips Achieva 3T TX-series scanner (Philips Healthcare, Best, 
Netherlands) at the University of Aberdeen, with a 32-channel phased-array head coil with a 
back-facing mirror (software version 5.1.7; gradients with maximum amplitude 80 mT/m and 
maximum slew rate 100 T/m/s). A projector and “Presentation” (Neurobehavioural Systems) 
version 18.1 were used for the presentation of task based fMRI.  
 
fMRI data were acquired with a TR = 1.56s and TE = 26ms. FA = 70’, FOV = 217mm, matrix size 
= 64 x 64. In-plane resolution was 3.4 x 3.4mm, with 32 5mm axial slices being acquired 
continuously with no gap. 573 volumes were collected, with the first six being discarded to 
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accommodate T1 saturation effects. A T1-weighted structural image was acquired as 160 
sagittal slices, with TR = 8.3ms, TE = 3.8ms, TI = 1031ms, FA = 8’, FOV = 240mm, matrix size = 
240 x 240, giving a resolution of 0.9 x 0.9 x 1.0mm. Data were preprocessed and analysed 
using SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, England; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/), within MathWorks MATLAB R2016a 
(http://www.mathworks.com). fMRI volumes were reconstructed into NIfTI format, and 
realigned to the mean volume. The structural image was segmented and warped to MNI 
space. The mean fMRI and structural volumes were coregistered, and the normalisation 
parameters applied to the whole fMRI dataset which was then smoothed using an 8mm 
FWHM gaussian kernel, and resampled at 2mm isotropic resolution. The data was high pass 
filtered with 128s cutoff, and serial correlations modelled using a first-order autoregressive 
model.  
 
Basic model flexible factorial analysis 
For both the cue phase and outcome phase second level analyses, the factor of participant 
was modelled as having independent and equal variance, as it was not anticipated that the 
healthy control population from which the sample was drawn would demonstrate wide 
variance between individuals. The factor of Choice/No-choice was also modelled for both 
these analyses, this time having dependent and equal variance, as this was a within-subjects 
comparison. The outcome phase analysis included the additional factor of reward amount 
(100 or 0 point): this was again modelled as dependent and equal variance, for the same 
reasons as Choice/No-choice.  
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Pavlovian reward learning methods 
Each trial was modeled over six time points, with the CS occurring at t = 1, and US at t = 3. The 
predicted value for each CS was calculated at each time point: 
 
Where V, w and x are vectors with separate entries for the Choice and No-choice indicators. 
X(t) is a binary vector denoting the presence of each Choice/No-choice indicator and w is the 
learned weight accorded to each CS. The predicted value V is updated at each time step 
according the PE, that is, to the difference between its estimation at the current time step, 
and the next: 
 
Where r(t) is the outcome at time t. This is 1 when 100 points are received, and 0 otherwise.  
λ is a temporal discounting factor, which was set to 1. Weights were updated for each trial 
according to: 
 
Where α is the learning rate.  
 
Functional imaging mask 
The striatal/dopaminergic midbrain mask was created from a union of Automated Anatomical 
Labeling-defined caudate and putamen; Brodmann-defined substantia nigra; and a 10mm 
sphere centred on the ventral tegmental area at MNI coordinates 0 -20 -10 (6), using the WFU 
Pickatlas (7; 8). 
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Behavioural results 
For a number of our participants, it was found that a random run of No-choice trials would 
lead to there being a relatively insufficient number of Choice trials for the computer to copy 
the behaviour of. In these circumstances, the system would default to forcing the participant 
to select the losing card during No-Choice trials. This led to some of our participants receiving 
a lower number of points for No-choice relative to Choice trials (Supplemental Figure S1). This 
issue had no correlation with age, QIDS depression, neuroticism or causality orientation 
metrics (p > 0.208). Point difference was included as a nuisance regressor in all the imaging 
analyses described here. We also performed an additional series of analyses where an 
additional factor of Group was modelled whereby participants were divided into independent 
groups with No-Choice/Choice scores <= 0.4, 0.4 < scores <= 0.6, 0.6 < scores <= 0.8 and scores 
> 0.8. The interaction between score group and Choice/No-choice was examined. Contrast 
estimates were also extracted to demonstrate how activation varied according to Choice and 
score group. 
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Supplemental Figure S1: The distribution of the difference in points for Choice and No-choice trials.  
 
 
During the Cue phase for the basic analysis (analogous to Table 1 in the main paper), there 
were no significant interactions between Choice/No-choice and score group (P > 0.246). 
Representative extracted contrast estimates for left insula and right putamen are shown in 
Supplemental Figure S2(a), which suggest that the Choice > No-choice effects reported are 
not attributable solely to point differences.  
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Supplemental Figure S2: (a) Cue phase contrast estimates demonstrating the apparent lack of impact 
of point differences on Choice > No-choice activation in two key regions reported in Table 2. (b) 
Outcome phase contrast estimates for two regions reported in Table 3. 
 
Likewise, for the Outcome phase, there were no score group x Choice/No-choice interactions 
(p > 0.432). Supplemental Figure S2(b) provides representative contrast estimates.  
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Supplemental Figure S3: Proportion of times the yellow (most rewarding) card was chosen during 
Choice trials.  
 
Basic model results: Outcome phase, reward 100 <> 0 
The main effect of reward 100 > 0 across both the Choice and No-choice conditions revealed 
robust activation within regions previously associated with typical reward responses, such as 
the nucleus accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex. The inverse contrast of 0 > 100 showed right 
angular gyrus, left supplementary motor area (SMA) and bilateral insula/inferior frontal gyrus 
(IFG) activation (Supplementary Table S1).  
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Supplemental Table S1: Outcome phase activation: reward 100 versus reward 0.  
Contrast Region MNI coords Voxels T Z P (FWE-
corrected) 
Reward 
100 > 0 
L + R occipital cortex 16 -94 10 
-14 -96 0 
13832 29.17 Inf <0.001 
L precentral gyrus -52 0 50 223 7.75 7.45 <0.001 
L nucleus accumbens -10 8 -12 102 6.42 6.24 <0.001 
L STG -56 -6 -12 200 6.42 6.24 <0.001 
R medial SFG 6 54 -8 504 5.56 5.44 0.001 
R ventral putamen 14 8 -8 4 5.13 5.04 0.004 
L orbitofrontal cortex -24 32 -16 16 4.72 4.65 0.021 
Reward 
0 > 100 
R angular gyrus 50 -56 56 998 6.15 5.99 <0.001 
L SMA -4 22 46 252 5.30 5.20 0.002 
R SFG 16 18 62 53 5.04 4.95 0.006 
L insula/IFG -38 20 -8 25 4.90 4.82 0.010 
R insula/IFG 44 18 4 12 4.76 4.69 0.018 
FWE-corrected p values are for the whole brain volume. IFG: inferior frontal gyrus. SFG: superior 
frontal gyrus. SMA: supplementary motor area. STG: superior temporal gyrus. 
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Supplemental Figure S4: Precuneus outcome activation in relation to Control (β = 0.396, p < 0.001) 
and Impersonal scores (β = -0.288, p = 0.012).  
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